v.1. Yuhak ŭi parwŏn kwa wansŏng -- v. 2. Chungguk Yuhak ŭi chŏn'gae -- v. 3. Han'guk ŭi Yuhak (sang) -- v. 4. Han'guk ŭi Yuhak (ha) -- v. 5. Ilbon kwa Pet'ŭnam ŭi Yuhak.

Ki Su Kim; J. S. Mill's Concept of Maturity as the Criterion in Determining Children's Eligibility for Rights, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 24, Is.

There is an embarrassing polarization of opinions about the status of economics as an academic discipline, as reflected in epithets such as the Dismal Science and the Queen of the Social Sciences. This collection brings together some of the leading figures in the methodology and philosophy of economics to provide a thoughtful and balanced overview of the current state of debate about the nature and limits of economic knowledge. Authors with partly rival and partly complementary perspectives examine how abstract models (...) work and how they might connect with the real world, they look at the special nature of the facts about the economy, and they direct attention towards the academic institutions themselves and how they shape economic research. These issues are thus analysed from the point of view of methodology, semantics, ontology, rhetoric, sociology, and economics of science. (shrink)

In ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’, Berlin wavered between two readings of the concept of positive liberty. In the first one, ‘positive liberty’ is a distinct concept, different from that of ‘negative liberty’. Those who advocate liberty in the negative sense and those who advocate it in the positive sense do not disagree on which interpretation of the same thing – ‘liberty’ – is the correct one; they speak about different things. Both defend valid ideals, although those ideals may not be (...) simultaneously achievable. In the second reading, negative and positive liberty are competing interpretations of the same concept, the defenders of negative liberty being involved in a substantive disagreement with the advocates of positive liberty on what the same term – ‘liberty’ – really means. On this understanding, negative and positive liberty cannot both be valid ideals: one of them (negative liberty) is a genuine value, the other (positive liberty) being nothing but the perversion of it. My article aims to uncover the roots of this ambiguity in unresolved difficulties in Berlin’s account of the history of the ideas of negative and positive liberty and, more importantly, in his conception of value pluralism. (shrink)

Hindi interpretation of Mīmāṃsāsūtra of Jaimini.

This paper systematises the works of György Márkus into two or possibly three periods. These emphasise the underlying consistency of purpose and interpreting theoretical interests throughout the oeuvre. despite the changing and socio-political forms and language games, all three share common features. These stages move from this initial critique of Orthodox Marxism employing the intellectual rigor of analytical and a philosophical anthropology to an investigation of the internal contradictions in Marx’s mature economic writings. to a final post-marxist phase after he (...) left Hungary dominated by continual philosophical themes and a social democratic political perspective. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 387 vs. "objective" is all no doubt rather imprecise, but points toward an important truth. In fact, in the contrast between them, we can see, I believe, not merely a clash of methods, standards or styles in writing history, but, more deeply still, an instance of the general antithesis between a "formalist" and a "sympathetic" sensibility, one encountered over and over in humanistic studies.6 PLATO New in (...) this section is an essay on "Some Controversial Points of Plato Interpretation Reconsidered" (pp. 183-209). Its first two parts combat the view that Plato ever gave up the metaphysics of his "middle period," but they do so only by rehearsing familiar theses about the Idea of the Good and the "two worlds" theory. These pages afford nothing new (apart from an extremely unfortunate appeal [p. 185 and again on p. 230] to an Homeric usage of the genitive to settle a problem at Rep. 518C9). The third part (pp. 194209 ) expands upon some views about later Plato for which Mme. de Vogel is already widely known, and these are very useful indeed. They offer a welcome expansion and defense of her view that in order to "do justice" (196-197, cf. 228) to the famous phrase,o) 7r,,v,e)~r ~v,t at Soph. 248E7, we must concede that Plato came to assign "the motion of a thinking mind" (208-209) to the very being of the Ideas, i.e., came to regard "the intelligibleworld as a vo~r (p. 194). Two interesting objections to her reading are confronted at some length (pp. 200-206) and several others are more briefly dealt with, thus affording her a good chance to explain her view. Valuable as these pages are, however, their upshot is rather unsatisfactory: just what Plato's view would, on her reading of it, really come to, remains mightily obscure--an obscurity she tends to concede but to explain away as Plato's "seeming peculiar to a modern mind" though we can get some grip upon his views if we but "take the trouble to follow his lead" (pp. 201, 198; cf. pp. 228-230, etc.). Such reminders of the genuine strangeness of Plato's view can no doubt be healthy in themselves, but can also be stultifying when reiterated in the face of genuine dissatisfaction with the sense that she makes of his meaning. This situation is not helped by the fact that, at crucial junctures in her argument, she buttresses her case about Plato's meaning by appeals to Aristotle's report at de Anima 1.2, 404b18-27 (see pp. 193-194, 199-200, 208, 277-281, 384-385). As she rightly reports (pp. 280, 385), Prof. Harold Cherniss has vigorously opposed the view that Aristotle is there giving Plato's view at all; yet--despite the fact that she has dedicated this volume to Cherniss--she never makes any reference to his most extended and most powerful defense of his position on this text, and much less does she attempt to answer his argument. (See Cherniss' review of H. D. Saffrey's book--a book to which de Vogel does refer, and repeatedly--in Gnomon 31 [1959], 36-51.) This matter is crucial, not merely as a bibliographical nicety, but because she tends to argue ]rom this text, maintaining that, however peculiar and isolated the sense of Soph. 248-249 and of certain phrases in the Timaeus may, on her reading of them, seem, this text proves that Plato must be read in her way. If it is not about Plato's view at all, it of course proves no such thing. The full weight of her argument will thus be borne by her view of how best to "do justice" to the text of Soph. 248E. Though she makes a clear and reasonable case 6 See Leo Steinberg's comments on this contrast as encountered in current art criticism: Other Criteria (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972), Essay 3 (especially pp. 63-68). His remarks about the prescriptive or "interdictory stance" of formalism also fit an important aspect of Burkert's book--an aspect which, though not articulated by her, accounts (I suspect... (shrink)

Cet article présente les politiques de promotion des sciences humaines poursuivies par le gouvernement coréen au cours des dernières années. Il explique l’importance accordée à ces disciplines dans le contexte du développement économique du pays et insiste sur l’importance que revêt une formation humaniste pour une compétitivité accrue de la Corée à l’échelle globale. Il détaille les actions et programmes principaux mis en place ainsi que les perspectives d’avenir. L’auteur dirige la Division de affaires universitaires auprès du Ministère de l’Éducation, (...) de la Science et de la Technologie de la République de Corée. (shrink)

v. 1. Chugŭl ttae kkaji i kŏrŭm ŭro -- v. 2. kyŏul i manil ondamyŏn -- v. 3. pabosae ŭi norae.

The association of emotions as kinds of affections is not unusual. This essay, however, considers whether the tight association between affections and emotions is conceptually satisfactory and advantageous. Does an emphasis on the boundedness of affections and emotions inadvertently mask their distinctive natures? In turning to Gustafson, Aquinas, and, ultimately, Edwards, I propose that, while affections are not emotionless, noticing their differences can reveal the limitations of the emotions for moral deliberation and draw greater attention to the moral significance of (...) the affections. (shrink)

In this book Sokolowski examines Husserl's basic phenomenological concepts, on the one hand, while proceeding from the perspective of Austin's linguistic analysis, on the other. His twofold concern is precisely indicated by the title and the subtitle re- spectively. This intellectual symbiosis makes the matter more comprehensible to a linguistic philosopher who wishes to be acquainted with Husserlian philosophy and also gives the book its particular style of exposition. It is indeed an excellent introduc- tion to Husserl's thoughts by means (...) of a sustained effort to clarify intricate notions through numerous concrete illustrations. This pedagogical method (which may be in- spired by the practice of teaching), far from being a shallow vulgarization, serves per- fectly the purpose of communicating a thorough knowledge as well as a correct under- standing of Husserrs texts, which substantiate the interpretations. Instead of generali- ties on Transcendental Idealism and trivialities on broad themes, the different chapters analyze successively the key notions of the Logical Investigations, the Phenomenology o] Internal Time Consciousness, Ideas, and the Formal and Transcendental Logic. (shrink)

Sustained reflection on multiple expressions of Asian American experience directs us to the coercive logic of racial identities. Noticing this logic is critical to identifying the limitations of several strategies to resist and transcend racial injustice, including the demand for racial recognition. Rereading the Parable of the Good Samaritan as one about the perils of racial identity and then taking cues from the nonviolent practice of truth force provide a blueprint that reimagines the liberative role racial identities can play.

This essay focuses on the growing disconnect between the diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) commitments of universities and their enrollment practices and considers the economic concerns buttressing this divergence. In response, this essay encourages universities—both administration and faculty—to reexamine the kinds of sacrifices necessary to recruit and support a student body that aligns with their DEI commitments.